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In Stanovich’s (2009a, 2011) dual-process theory, analytic processing occurs in the
algorithmic and reflective minds. Thinking dispositions, indexes of reflective mind
functioning, are believed to regulate operations at the algorithmic level, indexed by
general cognitive ability. General limitations at the algorithmic level impose constraints
on, and affect the adequacy of, specific strategies and abilities (e.g., numeracy). In
a study of 216 undergraduates, the hypothesis that thinking dispositions and general
ability moderate the relationship between numeracy (understanding of mathematical
concepts and attention to numerical information) and normative responses on probabilistic
heuristics and biases (HB) problems was tested. Although all three individual difference
measures predicted normative responses, the numeracy-normative response association
depended on thinking dispositions and general ability. Specifically, numeracy directly
affected normative responding only at relatively high levels of thinking dispositions and
general ability. At low levels of thinking dispositions, neither general ability nor numeric
skills related to normative responses. Discussion focuses on the consistency of these
findings with the hypothesis that the implementation of specific skills is constrained by
limitations at both the reflective level and the algorithmic level, methodological limitations
that prohibit definitive conclusions, and alternative explanations.
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INTRODUCTION
When the standards against which they are evaluated are tradi-
tional norms, performance on heuristics and biases (HB) tasks
is often poor (Kahneman et al., 1982; Reyna and Brainerd,
1995; Stanovich, 1999). Underlying most views of the “norma-
tive/descriptive gap” (see Baron, 2008) is the assumption that
rational thinking is “bounded” by information processing limi-
tations (e.g., working memory, processing speed). In accord with
this view, measured intelligence, generally assumed to index these
processing limitations, relates positively to normative responses
on several HB tasks. To the extent that measured intelligence
accurately taps individual differences in cognitive capacity, these
findings partially support the “bounded rationality” hypothesis.
The general modesty of the correlations (rs range = 0.20–0.45;
see Stanovich and West, 2008) implies, however, that consid-
erable variance in responding cannot be easily attributed to
computational limitations (see also Reyna, 2000).
Evidence that differences in general ability account for 20%
(or less) of the variability in normative responses was at least
partially responsible for research on the associations between
responses and less “bounded” individual difference variables.
Thus, in addition to research on specific intellectual competencies
(e.g., inhibition; Markovits et al., 2009; De Neys, 2012; Markovits,
2013), the focus of numerous investigations has been the relation-
ship between thinking dispositions (TD) and HB responses (e.g.,
Stanovich and West, 1998; see Stanovich, 2009b, 2012). Thinking
dispositions—relatively malleable cognitive styles, beliefs, intel-
lectual values, and motivations to manage cognitive resources
(e.g., expending effort, guarding against impulsivity, valuing
deliberate thinking, openness to using different strategies)—often
account for variance in performance independently from general
ability (Stanovich and West, 1998, 2000; Klaczynski and Lavallee,
2005; West et al., 2008; Toplak et al., 2011).
Research on TD and general ability (GA) has led to theoretical
models that distinguish between two levels of analytic processing.
Themost common distinction in dual-process theories is between
autonomous (or “Type I”) processing and analytic (or “Type II”)
processing (e.g., Evans, 2009, 2011; Klaczynski, 2009; Barrouillet,
2011; Stanovich, 2011; Evans and Stanovich, 2013). Autonomous
processing is triggered by task/situational factors, operates with-
out conscious awareness and automatically activates situationally-
relevant heuristics and other memories (e.g., procedural) that
can serve as the basis for inferences and judgments. Analytic
processing is conscious, deliberate, and cognitively demanding
and is responsible for judging the adequacy of autonomously-
produced representations and responses, determining whether to
override autonomous processing, and engaging conscious reason-
ing and decision making abilities (see Stanovich, 1999, 2009a;
Klaczynski, 2004; Evans, 2007). When predominant, analytic
processing guides the selection and operation of the cognitive
strategies and underlies complex reasoning and computations
(Stanovich, 2011).
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Stanovich (2004, 2009a; Stanovich and West, 2008; Stanovich
et al., 2011) has proposed the analytic processes are best conceived
as operating in two related “minds”: The reflective mind and the
algorithmicmind—hereafter referred to as the reflective and algo-
rithmic levels. Reflective-level operations, generally indexed by
measures of epistemic understanding and thinking dispositions,
regulate or govern algorithmic-level activities and are there-
fore metacognitive in nature. The algorithmic level, most often
indexed by measures of intelligence, comprises general cognitive
competencies, information processing efficiency (e.g., working
memory), reasoning abilities (inductive, deductive), and specific
computational and logical rules, strategies, and abilities. This
description suggests that the algorithmic level can be partitioned
into (a) general abilities, resources, and limitations on process-
ing efficiency and (b) specific abilities or “micro-strategies” (see
Stanovich, 2009a, p. 71). General processing resources are super-
ordinate to specific abilities in the sense that, in the absence of
sufficient resources, even individuals who possess the abilities
(e.g., numeracy, described subsequently) to solve particular prob-
lems will be incapable of fully utilizing those abilities and will
therefore err in their attempts.
The conceptual relationships among the reflective level, gen-
eral algorithmic-level resources, and specific algorithmic abilities
can be summarized as follows. First, because the reflective level
guides operations (e.g., specific strategy selection, computation
monitoring, response evaluation) at the algorithmic level, it is
superordinate to both general algorithmic resources and specific
algorithmic skills. Second, despite being “subordinate,” available
algorithmic resources necessarily limit the efficiency of reflective-
level functions. Third, the same algorithmic limitations impose
constraints on the quality (e.g., complexity) and functionality of
specific skills.
The present research was intended to provide a preliminary
test of the model of analytic processing outlined above and
examine the associations among thinking dispositions, general
ability, and numeracy. Broadly defined, numeracy is set of specific
algorithmic “micro-strategies” encompassing individuals’ under-
standing of, and ability to assign meaning to, mathematical con-
cepts (Nelson et al., 2008; Peters, 2012). Because numerous HB
tasks require at least a minimal understanding of probabilities,
numeracy is an algorithmic skill set with considerable promise
for advancing our understanding of the processes underlying
performance. Indeed, extant research indicates that numeracy is
associated with general ability and explains variance on some HB
tasks beyond that attributable to general ability and more specific
aspects of algorithmic competence (e.g., inhibition; Peters et al.,
2006; Nelson et al., 2008; Liberali et al., 2011; Toplak et al., 2011).
Despite these findings, several hypotheses directly relevant to
Stanovich’s theory of analytic processing have not been examined.
Specifically, the view of Stanovich’s theory espoused here, that
reflective operations guide general algorithmic operations and
that both reflective and algorithmic operations are important
determinants of whether numeric skills are used to generate
normative responses, implies specific conditions under which
numeracy predicts normative responses on probabilistic tasks.
Because reflective operations are critical to judging the adequacy
of automatically-activated representations and responses,
determining whether decoupling is necessary, understanding
task requirements (e.g., whether problems require numeric
computations), selecting specific algorithmic skills, monitoring
computational operations, and evaluating outcomes, a first
condition is adequate reflective-level functioning. A second
necessary condition is the availability of sufficient general algo-
rithmic capacity: Algorithmic resources (e.g., working memory)
are required not only to perform reflective operations and sustain
decoupled representations but also to effectively utilize numeric
abilities and conduct computations (Stanovich and West, 2008).
Thus, the effects of numeracy on responses should depend
on (i.e., be moderated by) thinking dispositions and cognitive
ability. This conjecture led to the hypotheses described below and
depicted in Figure 1.
(1) Inadequate reflective-level regulation. Inadequacies at the
reflective level should result in poor management of gen-
eral algorithmic resources, little attention to representa-
tion quality or consideration of alternative representations,
errors in specific ability selection, and little monitoring
of algorithmic operations. Therefore, regardless of general
ability, numeracy was not expected to relate to norma-
tive responding among participants with poorly developed
thinking dispositions.
(2) Inadequate general algorithmic resources. Because algorith-
mic resources limit the efficiency of both reflective-level
functions and numeric operations, participants low in gen-
eral ability were expected to respond non-normatively—
regardless of thinking dispositions and numeric ability.
(3a) Low numeric ability. Regardless of levels of reflective and
algorithmic functioning, to perform well on probabilistic
problems, individuals must have adequate numeric abilities.
Those with poor numeric abilities were expected to respond
non-normatively—regardless of reflective skills (TD) and
algorithmic resources (GA).
(3b) High numeric ability. From the model described previously
and the preceding hypotheses, it follows that, among par-
ticipants high in numeric ability, only those who also have
high levels of thinking dispositions and general intellectual
ability would respond normatively1.
The above predictions apply only to conflict problems—that is,
problems wherein different responses are implied by task content
(e.g., stereotype-activating information) and task structure (e.g.,
probability information). In contrast to conflict (i.e., CN) prob-
lems, on no-conflict (i.e., N-CN) problems, responses triggered
automatically by task content are the same (i.e., normative) as
responses based correct application of analytic abilities (De Neys,
1The theoretical speculations advanced here imply causal relationships among
thinking dispositions, general ability, and numeracy. However, with the excep-
tion of the conflict/no-conflict problem comparisons, the research was cor-
relational. In the Results, terms that connote causality are sometimes used
because of space considerations and because such terms (e.g., “direct” effects)
are used in discussions of moderation. Although the observed relationships
may be causal, they should be interpreted cautiously and with consideration
of alternative explanations (see Discussion).
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FIGURE 1 | Predicted relationships among thinking dispositions, general ability, numeracy, and normative responses on probabilistic HB tasks.
2012). Although responses on N-CN problems have been exam-
ined in some investigations (e.g., De Neys and Van Gelder, 2009;
Thompson and Johnson, 2014; see also research on belief-biased
reasoning; e.g., Evans et al., 1983), N-CN problems are often not
examined in HB research. However, because normative responses
should be considerably more frequent on N-CN problems than
on CN problems and because N-CN responses should not be
diagnostic of underlying processes, performance on N-CN prob-
lems should correlate with neither performance on CN problems
nor the individual difference measures. Preliminary analyses were
intended to explore these hypotheses for no-conflict problems (in




As part of a larger investigation, 219 undergraduates earned
course credit for participating in single 60–80min session (in
groups of 4–8 students) during which they reported their verbal
and quantitative SAT scores, completed measures of numeracy,
general ability, and thinking dispositions, and responded to a
battery of HB tasks.
MATERIALS
Thinking dispositions
The 52-item TD questionnaire, based on similar measures used
by Stanovich and West (e.g., Stanovich and West, 1998, 2007)
and Klaczynski (e.g., Klaczynski and Lavallee, 2005), contained
five subscales (items were intermixed randomly). The 10-item
flexible thinking scale measured willingness to take into account
multiple perspectives and beliefs that complex decisions cannot
be reduced to “either-or” choices (Macpherson and Stanovich,
2007). The 10-item reflectiveness vs. intuition scale assessed beliefs
that logic and careful analysis leads to better decisions than
reliance on intuitions (Epstein et al., 1995). The 12-item need
for cognition scale measured valuation of intellectual challenges,
complex thinking, and logical deliberation (see Cacioppo et al.,
1996). The 14-item impulsive decision making scale tapped ten-
dencies to make decisions “on the spur of the moment” (i.e.,
without considering consequences or alternatives) and believe
that the best decisions are made quickly (see Patton et al.,
1995). The 8-item epistemic regulation scale indexed understand-
ing that belief conflicts can be resolved by considering the
best available evidence (based on Kuhn, 2006 and Moshman,
2013). Participants responded to each item on a 6-point scale
(1 = strongly disagree; 6 = strongly agree).
To reduce the number of analyses, a composite TD score
was computed (M = 161.68, SD = 13.85). The composite was
justified by the positive correlations among subscales (smallest
r = 0.25) and the higher internal consistency (α = 0.78) and
stronger correlations with responses for the composite than for
the subscales.
General ability
Both verbal ability and inductive reasoning ability were assessed.
Verbal ability, best indexed by vocabulary, is among the foremost
indicators of global and crystallized intelligence. Fluid intelli-
gence, perhaps the best indicator of algorithmic-level functioning
(Stanovich, 2009a,b), was indexed by scores on an inductive
reasoning test.
Verbal ability. A 30-item vocabulary test (M = 21.87; SD =
2.72), based on the Shipley-2 vocabulary test (Shipley et al.,
2010), was administered. Pilot testing indicated a correlation of
0.89 between the revised and the original tests. The Shipley-2
has excellent internal and test-retest reliability and relates moder-
ately/strongly to academic achievement, general intelligence, and
other indexes of crystallized intelligence (Prokosch et al., 2005;
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Kaya et al., 2012). On each item, a target word (e.g., jocose) was
followed by four options (e.g., humorous, paltry, fervid, plain).
Correct responses required selecting the word with same mean-
ing as the target. Three minutes were given to complete as many
items as possible.
Inductive ability. A 20-item inductive reasoning test (M = 10.75;
SD = 1.72) was administered. Items were selected after remov-
ing the easiest and most difficult items from the PMA Letter Sets
test (Thurstone, 1962). In pilot testing, the original PMA and
the reduced version were correlated highly (r = 0.84). Scores on
the original test and shortened versions of the test correlate well
with general intelligence and other indexes of fluid intelligence
(Hertzog and Bleckley, 2001; Colom et al., 2007). From five sets
of four letters (e.g., ACDE, MOPQ, FGIJ, DFGH, TVWX), par-
ticipants indicated the set that did not belong with the other sets
(e.g., FGIJ) and completed as many items as they could in 12min.
A composite ability score was analyzed for several reasons.
First, inductive and verbal scores correlatedmoderately (r = 0.47;
Kaya et al., 2012, reported a similar correlation). Second, scores
on the two measures related similarly to normative responses.
Third, the combined ability score correlated better (see Table 2)
with normative responses than inductive ability (rs ranged from
0.21 to 0.28) or verbal ability (rs ranged from 0.22 to 0.27).
Numeracy
Participants completed a 20-item objective numeracy test (α =
0.82; M = 11.39, SD = 3.53). Objective numeracy tests (in
contrast to subjective tests) contain items that measure basic
probability skills, such as those involved in converting ratios to
percentages (and vice versa) and analyzing fractions (e.g., 2/20
vs. 3/40) to determine relative probabilities. The numeracy test
(available from the author) was similar to the tests used by Peters
et al. (2006), Nelson et al. (2008), and Liberali et al. (2011) and
an included items from (or adapted from) Lipkus et al. (2001),
Garfield (2003), Irwin and Irwin (2005), and Klaczynski and
Amsel (2014).
Each item included a problem that required understanding a
probabilistic concept and selecting, from 3–5 response options,
the correct solution (e.g., from a list of 20 names, the chances a
randomly selected name would begin an “A”; the probability that
a randomly selected person would be a doctor who also enjoys
hiking in a group of 100 people with three doctors and eight peo-
ple who enjoy hiking). The predictive value and validity of the
test were established in two developmental studies of responses
on HB problems similar to those described subsequently. In both
studies, numeracy increased with age and accounted for more
variance in normative responding than age or ability. Using a sim-
ilar measure, Klaczynski and Amsel (2014) found that numeracy
predicted differences on probabilistic reasoning tasks better than
age or nationality (Chinese or American).
Heuristics and biases tasks
Given the definition of numeracy given previously, numeracy
should be a better predictor of normative responses on prob-
abilistic HB problems than of normative responses on non-
probabilistic problems. The battery, presented in one of four
randomly determined orders and mixed with problems from a
larger study (order was not related to responses on any HB task
or to any of the individual difference measures), included eight
base rate neglect (BR), eight law of large numbers (LLN), eight
ratio bias (RB), and eight covariation judgment (COV) problems.
For each of task (i.e., BR, LLN, RB, COV), there were four con-
flict (CN) problems and four no-conflict (N-CN) problems. On
both the conflict and no-conflict versions of each task, normative
scores could range from 0 to 4; mean proportions of norma-
tive responses are presented in the Results to increase the ease
of comparing the findings with other research. Examples of con-
flict and no-conflict versions of each task are presented in the
Supplementary material2.
Base rate neglect problems. Each problem intended to elicit base
rate neglect contained two types of information: (1) Base rate
data indicating the number of people in each of two groups and
(2) descriptions of individual “targets” that were consistent with
stereotypes associated with one group (e.g., knitting, gardening).
On CNproblems, target descriptions “pulled” for responses based
on group stereotypes and the base rates (e.g., 125 17-year-olds
and 25 50-year-olds) pulled for the normative response that tar-
gets were not likely to be members of the stereotyped groups. The
stereotypes thus cued responses that conflicted with normative
responses. The target descriptions in the N-CN problems were
identical to those in the CN problems; however, on the N-CN
problems the base rates (e.g., 25 17-year-olds and 125 50-year-
olds) indicated that targets were likely in the stereotyped group.
Normative responses were thus cued by both the stereotypes and
the base rates (see also De Neys and Glumicic, 2008).
On each problem, participants judged target group member-
ship on 4-point scales (e.g., 1 = Very likely to be 17 years old;
2 = Somewhat likely 17 years old; 3 = Somewhat likely to be 50
years old; 4 = Very likely to be 50 years old; reversed for half the
problems). Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Toplak et al.,
2014), responses on the CN problems were considered normative
(scored “1”) when participants rated that targets as unlikely or
very unlikely to be in the stereotyped group and responses on the
N-CN problems were scored normative when participants rated
targets as likely or very likely to be in the stereotyped group.
Law of large numbers. Adapted from Fong et al. (1986),
Stanovich and West (1998), and Klaczynski (2001), these prob-
lems involved making decisions after reviewing arguments
founded on large evidential samples and arguments based on
small samples of personal and relatively vivid evidence. On CN
problems, large sample arguments supported one decision and
small sample arguments supported a different decision. On the
N-CN problems, the large sample and small sample arguments
supported the same decision. On four problems (two CN, two
N-CN), the large sample arguments were presented before the
2In a larger investigation, numeracy was only related weakly to responses on
non-probabilistic problems. Despite GA and TD correlations to responses
similar to those reported here, the TD × GA × Numeracy interaction was
not significant; instead, the TD × GA interaction was a significant predictor
of responses.
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small sample arguments. On the other four problems (two CN,
two N-CN), the small sample arguments were presented first.
Participants indicated the decision they judged best on 4-point
scales (1= “Decision ‘A’ is a much better decision”; 2= “Decision
‘A’ is a better decision”; 3 = “Decision ‘B’ is a better decision”;
4 = “Decision B is a much better decision,” where “Decision B”
indicated preference for the large sample argument). For half the
problems, the rating scale was reversed and later recoded; con-
sequently, on both the CN and N-CN problems, ratings of 3
and 4 reflected greater reliance on the large sample arguments.
Following Stanovich and West (1998), Klaczynski (2001), and
Toplak et al. (2007), ratings ≥3 were considered normative and
assigned scores of 1.
Ratio bias. On the RB problems (Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994),
participants judged whether targets (e.g., winning lottery tick-
ets) were more likely if a person selected from a relatively large
numerator/large denominator sample (e.g., nine winning tick-
ets in 100 total tickets) or a relatively small numerator/small
denominator sample (e.g., one winning ticket in 10 total tick-
ets). The RB effect occurs when individuals believe that targets
are more likely from relatively large samples than from relatively
small samples. Reyna and Brainerd (2008) distinguished between
heuristic RB problems (i.e., identical probabilities in the two sam-
ples) and non-optimal RB problems (i.e., probabilities favor the
smaller sample). Although the RB effect has been reported on
both heuristic and non-optimal problems, non-optimal problems
were used in the present research because the normative response
(e.g., on CN problems, targets were more likely from the smaller
sample) was more similar to normative responses on the other
tasks than was the normative response on heuristic problems (i.e.,
neither sample is more likely to yield a target).
On each problem, the absolute number of targets (i.e., numer-
ators) and the total (i.e., targets plus non-targets; denominators)
was higher in the large sample than in the small sample. On
CN problems, target probability was higher in the smaller sam-
ple. By contrast, on N-CN problems, the absolute numbers of
targets and the probabilities of targets were higher in the larger
samples: Similar to the N-CN contingency detection problems
(described next), normative selections could be based on calcu-
lating and comparing ratios or simply comparing numerators.
On two CN and two N-CN problems, the small sample response
was presented before by the large sample response; on the other
CN and N-CN problems, the larger sample option was presented
before the small sample option. A third option (that target prob-
ability was the same in the two samples) was always presented
last. Participants judged which, if either, sample was more likely
to yield a target (e.g., winning lottery ticket). Judgments were
normative (scored “1”) when the small sample was selected on
the CN problems and the large sample was selected on the N-CN
problems.
Covariation judgment problems. Based on Wasserman et al.
(1990) and modeled after the problems in Stanovich and West
(1998), Klaczynski (2001), and De Neys and Van Gelder (2009),
each problem described a hypothetical investigation of a poten-
tially causal relationship between two variables. Descriptions
were accompanied by 2 × 2 contingency tables summarizing the
results (i.e., numbers of cases) in each of the four cells: (putative)
cause-present/effect-present, cause-absent/effect-present, cause-
absent/effect-present, and cause-absent/effect-absent (labeled the
A–D cells; Wasserman et al., 1990). Relationship strength can
be determined by computing phi (ϕ) or comparing conditional
probabilities [A/(A + B) − C/(C + D)], although less precise
ratio comparisons yield relationships in the same direction as
ϕ. When Cell A is clearly larger and more salient than Cell B
(and Cell C), adults often adopt the simple strategy of compar-
ing numbers of cases in Cell A with the numbers of Cell B (or
Cell C; see Alloy and Tabachnik, 1984; Maldonado et al., 2006).
As discussed by fuzzy-trace theorists, this numerosity bias is sim-
ilar to that found on RB problems (see Reyna and Brainerd,
2008).
On the CN problems, the absolute numbers in Cell A (e.g., 35)
were greater than the numbers in cell B (e.g., 26) and cell C (e.g.,
27), but the ϕ coefficients were negative (in this example, Cell D
was 11). Thus, judgments based on comparing Cell A with Cell
B or Cell C conflicted with judgments based on computing ϕ or
comparing ratios. On the N-CN problems, the absolute numbers
in Cell A (e.g., 37) were also greater than the numbers in Cells
B (e.g., 15) and C (e.g., 23), but the ϕ coefficients were positive
(e.g., 18 in Cell B). Thus, normative solutions could be based on
computing conditional probabilities, comparing ratios, or simply
comparing Cell A with Cell B or Cell C.
Participants judged relationship strength on 5-point scales
(1 = strong negative relationship; 5 = strong positive relationship;
reversed for two CN and two NC problems). After recoding prob-
lems with reversed rating scales, responses were judged normative
(scored “1”) when participants indicated that the correlations
were negative (i.e., ratings <3) on the CN problems and positive
on the N-CN problems (i.e., ratings>3).
PROCEDURE
The ability measures, because they were timed, were always
administered before the other measures. For about half of the
participants, the HB battery was presented next, followed by the
thinking dispositions questionnaire and the numeracy measure.
For the remaining participants, presentation order was the think-
ing dispositions questionnaire, numeracy test, and HB battery.
Order was not significantly related to either normative responses
or individual difference variables (largest r = 0.11).
RESULTS
CONFLICT AND NO-CONFLICT PROBLEMS
To examine whether normative responses were more frequent on
N-CN problems than on CN problems, a multivariate analysis of
variance, with normative scores on the four tasks as dependent
variables and problem type (CN or N-CN) as a within-subjects
variable, was conducted. The anticipated main effect of problem
type was significant, F(1, 215) = 1617.26, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.88:
On each task, normative responses were more frequent on N-
CN problems than on CN problems, smallest F(1, 215) = 295.17,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.60. Mean proportions of normative responses
on the conflict and no-conflict problems are presented in
Table 1.
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CORRELATIONS BETWEEN NORMATIVE RESPONSES AND PREDICTORS
The next analyses were intended to determine whether no-
conflict scores on the four tasks were related to each other, conflict
scores, and the individual difference measures (i.e., TD, GA, and
numeracy). With the exception of negative correlations between
scores on the NC-LLN and CN-COV problems and between
scores on the NC-RB and NC-COV problems, no correlations
between no-conflict scores on the different tasks or between
responses on no-conflict and conflict problems were significant
(see Table 2). Similarly, no correlations between the individ-
ual difference variables and no-conflict scores were significant
(largest r = 0.11). Next, the correlations among responses on
the conflict versions of the tasks and the correlations among the
hypothesized predictors were examined. As expected, and consis-
tent with prior research (Stanovich and West, 1998; Klaczynski,
2001; Chiesi et al., 2011), responses on the conflict versions
of each task correlated positively (see Table 2). The predictors
were also significantly related (TD-ability = 0.19, p < 0.01; TD-
numeracy= 0.22, p < 0.01; ability-numeracy= 0.31, p < 0.001).
SAT scores also related to TD, ability, and numeracy (rs = 0.27,
0.22, 0.25, respectively, all ps < 0.01). However, when they were
significant, the relationships between SAT scores and norma-
tive responses were weak relative to the correlations between
normative responses and the other predictors (see Table 3).
More central to the goals of this investigation were the cor-
relations between conflict responses and the hypothesized pre-
dictors. Note that, although the relationships between normative
responses and interactions between predictors (e.g., Numeracy ×
Ability) are not typically examined in HB research (see, how-
ever, Stanovich and West, 2008; Chiesi et al., 2011; Handley
et al., 2011), the study’s hypotheses required analyses of these
Table 1 | Mean proportions (and SDs) of normative responses on the
conflict and no-conflict problems.
Task Conflict No conflict
Base rate 0.49 (0.24) 0.87 (0.21)
Law of large numbers 0.41 (0.23) 0.92 (0.16)
Ratio bias 0.36 (0.21) 0.90 (0.19)
Covariation 0.34 (0.19) 0.88 (0.19)
Table 2 | Correlations between responses on the conflict and
no-conflict problems.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. CN: BR 0.34c 0.34c 0.26c −0.02 −0.12 −0.06 0.09
2. CN: LLN 0.36c 0.31c 0.09 0.11 0.02 −0.03
3. CN: RB 0.40c −0.01 −0.09 −0.01 −0.02
4. CN: COV 0.05 −0.14a 0.09 −0.11
5. N-CN: BR 0.03 −0.09 −0.18b
6. N-CN: LLN −0.06 0.02
7. C-CN: RB 0.07
8. N-CN: COV
ap < 0.05; bp < 0.01; cp < 0.001.
relationships. That is, positive correlations between the TD ×
Ability × Numeracy interaction and normative responses would
be consistent—and thus provide initial support for—the specu-
lation that effects associated with numeracy are constrained by
ability and TD.
The correlations of the individual predictors and the predictor
interaction terms (computed by standardizing and then multi-
plying TD, ability, and numeracy scores) to responses on each
task and a composite score (normative responses on each task
summed and divided by four) are presented in Table 3. TD, abil-
ity, and numeracy correlated positively with individual task scores
and composite scores, supporting the hypothesis that each vari-
able would predict responses. Of the two-way interactions, the
Ability × Numeracy interaction correlated positively with the
individual task scores and composite scores. More important,
however, were the significant correlations of the TD × Ability ×
Numeracy interaction to individual task scores and composite
scores. As noted above, these particular correlations are consistent
with the speculation that the “effects” of numeracy on responses
were at least partially constrained by ability and TD. Although
promising, the findings from this analysis represent only a first
step toward testing the hypothesis. An important second step
entailed determining whether the three-way interaction explained
variance in normative responses beyond that associated with the
individual predictors and the two-way predictor interactions.
PREDICTING NORMATIVE RESPONSES
In and of themselves, the correlational findings do not indicate
whether TD constrained the numeracy-response relationships
or, alternatively, whether TD constrained the ability-response
relationships. To reduce the number of additional analyses, subse-
quent analyses focused on composite scores. This focus is justified
by the significant relationships among individual task scores, a
principal components factor analysis that yielded a single score
with an eigenvalue > 1 (54.18% of the variance among scores;
smallest loading = 0.69), and the finding that results for the indi-
vidual tasks closely paralleled the results from the analyses of the
composite3.
3In subsequent analyses of composite scores, similar results obtained when
factor scores were analyzed.
Table 3 | Correlations between predictors and responses on the
conflict problems.
BR LLN RB COV Comp.
SAT 0.10 0.11 0.15a 0.15a 0.18b
TD 0.27c 0.25c 0.28c 0.32c 0.36c
Ability 0.28c 0.28c 0.31c 0.30c 0.38c
Numeracy 0.30c 0.25c 0.28b 0.31c 0.39c
TD × Ability 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.08
TD × Numeracy 0.04 0.14a 0.12 0.06 0.10
Ability × Numeracy 0.17b 0.16a 0.19b 0.21b 0.25c
TD × Ability × Numeracy 0.28c 0.26c 0.26c 0.32c 0.36c
ap < 0.05; bp < 0.01; cp < 0.001.
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To determine (a) which predictors accounted for unique vari-
ance in normative responses and (b) whether the predictor inter-
action terms accounted for variance in composite scores beyond
the variance associated with the individual predictors, a hierar-
chical multiple regression analysis was conducted on composite
scores. SAT-Math scores were entered at the first step and TD,
GA, and numeracy were entered at the second step. To determine
whether they accounted for additional variance, the two-way
interaction terms were entered at the third step and the three-
way interaction term was entered at the final step. Significant
contributions of the TD×Numeracy and GA×Numeracy inter-
actions would suggest that numeracy moderated the relationships
of TD and GA to normative responses and a significant contribu-
tion of the TD × GA × Numeracy interaction would imply that
the numeracy-normative response relationship depended on both
TD and GA4.
Results from the final step, and incremental variance explained
by the predictors at each step, are presented in Table 3. In
total, the predictors and interaction terms accounted for 35.9%
of the variance in composite scores. TD, ability, and numer-
acy were significant independent predictors, as were the GA ×
Numeracy and the TD × GA × Numeracy interactions. The sig-
nificant predictive value of these interactions implies that the
effects of ability, numeracy, and TD were less straightforward
than implied by the significant beta values of the individual
predictors. The three-way interaction, which contributed an addi-
tional 2.1% of variance beyond that explained by the other
predictors, is particularly important because it implies that the
numeracy-normative response relationship depended on GA and
TD. Unfortunately, the regression results provide little informa-
tion regarding the specific nature of the interactive relation-
ships and thus do not fully address the investigation’s central
hypothesis. Although consistent with the Hypotheses (3a) and
(3b), the significant predictive value of the three-way interac-
tion does not indicate that the numeracy-normative association
differed for low and high TD participants whose general abili-
ties were low or high and therefore is insufficient evidence for
conclusions regarding the constraining effects of TD and GA on
the numeracy-normative response association. Consequently, an
alternative approach was needed to determine whether the rela-
tionship between numeracy and normative responses depended
on whether thinking dispositions and general ability were high
or low.
ABILITY AND THINKING DISPOSITIONS AS MODERATORS OF THE
NUMERACY-RESPONSE ASSOCIATION
The hypothesis that the numeracy-response relationship would
be significant only if TD and general ability were relatively high is
a moderation hypothesis. To test the speculation that numeracy
differences depended on both ability and thinking dispositions,
Hayes’ (2012; for related discussions, see Shrout and Bolger,
2002; Preacher et al., 2007; Hayes, 2013) SPSS macro and, specif-
ically, “process model 3” was used to conduct a “moderated
4No interaction that included total SAT scores or SAT-MATH scores related
to, or predicted, composite scores. However, because they related to composite
scores, SAT scores were included in subsequent analyses as covariates.
moderation” analysis. In brief, the process macro uses ordinary
least squares regression to estimate the coefficients for each pre-
dictor and their interactions. Process model 3 is useful in deter-
mining the significance of the interactions between and among
an independent variable and two moderators. Results indicated
whether effects related to numeracy depended on GA and TD
and whether the numeracy-composite relationship was signifi-
cant only when GA and TD were relatively high. As suggested by
the foregoing regression analyses, support for the hypothesis was
contingent on the significance of the three-way interaction (i.e.,
Numeracy × GA × TD)5.
By default, Hayes’ (2012) macro constructs three levels (sub-
sequently referred to as “low,” “moderate,” and “high”; levels are
centered around the means; i.e., the mean and ± 1 SD from the
mean) for the IV and eachmoderator. If the three-way interaction
is significant, these levels are used to examine the significance of
the interaction between numeracy and ability at each level of the
moderator (TD). At least in a general sense, the analysis paral-
lels a 3 (numeracy) × 3 (ability) × 3 (TD) analysis of variance.
However, unlike analysis of variance approaches, but consistent
with current approaches to moderation and mediation (Preacher
et al., 2007), bootstrapping procedures are used to obtain 95%
confidence intervals. Confidence intervals provided a basis for
estimating whether, at each ability level within each TD level,
numeracy was significantly related to composite scores. Effects
were considered significant when confidence intervals did not
contain zero (Hayes, 2012). In the results presented below, LLCI
and ULCI refer to lower level and upper level confidence interval,
respectively.
To test the hypothesis that numeracy would “directly” affect
responses only when TD and GA were high, numeracy was
entered as the “independent” variable, TD was entered as a
one moderator, and ability was entered a second moderator.
SAT-MATH scores and a composite N-CN score were entered as
covariates. As in the regression analysis, the covariates, numer-
acy, GA, TD, and their interactions accounted for 36% of the
variance in composite scores, F(9, 206) = 12.20, p < 0.0001.
TD (β = 0.0023, t = 2.98, p = 0.0032, LLCI/ULCI =
0.0008/0.0038), ability (β = 0.0092, t = 3.47, p = 0.0006;
LLCI/ULCI = 0.0042/0.0152), and numeracy (β = 0.0092,
t = 2.81, p = 0.0054; LLCI/ULCI = 0.0027/0.0156) were
significant predictors (neither covariate was a significant
5Similar results obtained from a 2 (TD group) × 2 (ability group) × 2
(numeracy group) ANOVA on composite scores. In the low TD group, no
effects related to numeracy were significant (ps > 0.20). In the high TD group,
the Ability × Numeracy interaction was significant, F(1, 103) = 16.71, p <
0.001, η2p = 0.07. When TD was high, but ability was low, scores did not differ
in the by numeracy group, F < 1. However, when TD and ability were high,
the high numeracy group performed better than the low numeracy group,
F(1, 61) = 35.83, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.37. Similar results obtained when Bayes
factor—indicating the likelihood that the high and low numeracy groups
differed—was computed at each TD and GA level (with r was set at 0.50; see
http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor). Comparisons between the high and low
numeracy groups for (a) low TD/low GA participants, (b) low TD/high GA
participants, (c) high TD/low GA participants, and (d) high TD/high GA par-
ticipant yielded Bayes factors of 1.113, 0.417, 1.923, and 7.283, respectively
(the final factor is considered moderate/strong).
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predictor, ts < 1). The Ability × Numeracy interaction
(β = 0.0021, t = 2.29, p = 0.0178; LLCI/ULCI = 0.0004/0.0038)
and the TD × Ability × Numeracy (β = 0.0001, t = 2.15,
p = 0.0322; ULCI/LLCI = 0.0000/0.0002) interactions were
significant. The three-way interaction indicated that the effects
related to numeracy differed by levels of thinking dispositions and
ability 6.
The results presented in Table 4 show the effects of GA and
numeracy at each TD level. As expected, the Numeracy × Ability
interaction was not significant at the lowest TD level. Indeed,
when TD low, the numeracy-response association was not sig-
nificant at any ability level. By contrast, at moderate and high
levels of TD, the Numeracy × Ability interaction was significant.
The additional results shown in the table revealed that, when
TD was moderate or high, numeracy directly affected normative
responses only if GA was also moderate or high. These find-
ings, depicted in Figure 2, support the general hypothesis that
TD and GA constrained the effects of numeracy on responding
to probabilistic HB tasks.
6Hayes (2012) refers to Process 3 as a “moderated moderation” analysis,
intended to determine whether the effects of an independent variable interact
with the effects of two other variables (moderators). Although the decision
to enter TD and GA as moderators and numeracy as the IV was theoretical,
the analysis is nonetheless analogous to an analysis of variance (see Footnote
5) with three levels for each “IV.” As such, the three-way interaction was sig-
nificant regardless of which variables were entered as moderators and which
was entered as the IV. For instance, with numeracy was the IV, GA as the
first moderator, and TD as the second moderator, the variance explained
was identical. The primary difference is that, instead of presenting the GA
× Numeracy interaction (and simple effects of numeracy) within each TD
level, this alternative analysis indicated whether the TD × Numeracy interac-
tion was significant at each GA level and, within GA levels, the direct affects
of numeracy when TD was low, moderate, and high. However, in contrast to
the findings presented here, the TD × Numeracy interaction was significant
only when GA was high. Otherwise, the results of the follow-up analyses were
analogous to those in Table 5: Numeracy directly affected responses when GA
was moderate and high and when TD was also moderate and high.
Table 4 | Hierarchical multiple regression analysis on composite
scores (β and t-values from final step).
Predictors R2 F B β t
SAT 0.03 6.14a 0.00 −0.02 <1
TD, ability, numeracy 0.27 27.72c
TD 0.00 0.20 3.12b
GA 0.01 0.24 3.66c
Numeracy 0.01 0.20 3.19b
Two-way interactions 0.04 3.66a
TD × Ability 0.00 0.01 <1
TD × Numeracy 0.01 0.05 <1
Ability × Numeracy 0.03 0.18 2.90b
Numeracy × Ability × TD 0.02 7.11c 0.02 0.17 2.68b
ap < 0.05; bp < 0.01; cp = 0.001.
DISCUSSION
This study showed that normative responses on no-conflict prob-
lems are typically related to neither responses on conflict prob-
lems nor thinking dispositions, general ability, or numeracy. By
contrast, normative responses on conflict problems related posi-
tively to all three individual difference variables. After accounting
for variance attributable to thinking dispositions, general abil-
ity, and numeracy entered separately, the Thinking Disposition ×
General Ability×Numeracy interaction accounted for additional
variance in normative responses on the conflict problems.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the present
research are the findings bearing on hypotheses based on
Stanovich’s (2009a, 2011) theory of analytic processing. As antic-
ipated by Hypotheses (1) and (2), when TD was low—regardless
of whether general ability was low, moderate, or high—and
when GA was low—regardless of whether thinking dispositions
were low, moderate, or high —numeracy was unrelated to nor-
mative responses. Although based on correlational data, these
preliminary findings are consistent with the proposed relation-
ship between the reflective and algorithmic levels. Deficiencies
at the reflective level appear to limit the efficacy of algorith-
mic functions. Thus, even the most intellectually able (regardless
of numeric ability) solved few probabilistic HB problems cor-
rectly when their epistemic beliefs and thinking dispositions were
poorly calibrated. Conversely, algorithmic limitations appear to
Table 5 | Moderated mediation results: effects of numeracy on
normative responding by TD level and ability level (within TD levels).
Numeracy × ability Predicting composite normative
responses
Estimate t LLCI ULCI
Low TD 0.0003 <1 −0.00021 0.0028
Ability
Low 0.0058 >1 −0.10057 0.0174
Moderate 0.0071 1.57 −0.5771a 0.0161
High 0.0085 1.18 −0.1885a 0.0226
Moderate TD 0.0021 2.39a 0.0004 0.0038
Ability
Low 0.0012 <1 −0.0088 0.0113
Moderate 0.0092 2.81a 0.0027 0.0156
High 0.0171 4.09b 0.0089 0.0254
High TD 0.0038 3.35b 0.0016 0.0061
Ability
Low −0.0034 <1 −0.0180 0.0113
Moderate 0.0112 2.55a 0.0025 0.0199
High 0.0258 5.55b 0.0166 0.0350
Note. Numeracy × Ability = Numeracy × Ability interaction at each TD level.
Within TD levels, significance of numeracy at low, moderate, high ability lev-
els. Ability and TD levels are derived from means and ± one SD (TD ± 13.85;
Ability ± 3.83) from the respective means. LLCI and ULCI = 95% bias corrected
lower lever confidence interval and upper level confidence interval, respectively
(5000 bootstrap samples). ap < 0.05; bp <0.001.
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constrain the efficacy of reflective functions: Participants at the
highest level of reflective functioning (regardless of numeric abil-
ity) performed little better than those at the lowest TD level
when they lacked the cognitive resources to conduct reflec-
tive operations (e.g., selecting appropriate micro-strategies or
mindware, evaluating task representations) and perform correct
computations.
Among the most novel contributions of this research, however,
were those pertaining to Hypothesis (3b). Consistent with expec-
tations, when TD was moderate-high and ability was moderate-
high, numeracy associated positively with normative responding.
The effects of numeracy were thus moderated by both thinking
dispositions and ability. These findings support the position that
relatively high levels of reflective and general algorithmic func-
tioning are both necessary for numeracy to influence responding,
at least on probabilistic tasks. As indicated in Figure 2, when they
lacked either the requisite thinking dispositions or general intel-
lectual competencies, highly numeric individuals were no more
likely than less numeric individuals to respond normatively.
To a greater extent than prior research, these findings support
the perspective previously outlined on Stanovich’s (2009a, 2011)
theory of analytic processing. First, the findings were not limited
to a single task but extended across four probabilistic reasoning
FIGURE 2 | Moderated moderation results: effects of numeracy levels
and ability level on normative responding at low (upper graph),
moderate (middle graph), and high (bottom graph) TD levels.
tasks. Second, few investigations have entailed examinations of
the interactive effects of thinking dispositions, general ability, and
specific abilities (micro-strategies or mindware) on reasoning.
Third, the moderated moderation analytic approach afforded a
more precise exploration of the hypothesized relationships than
other approaches (e.g., ANOVAs based on median split-created
groups). Finally, the results not only implicated numeracy as an
important contributor to probabilistic reasoning but also pro-
vided theoretically-consistent evidence relevant to the conditions
under which numeracy predicts normative responding:When TD
and GA are both fairly high (note that the precise meaning of
“moderate” and “high” TD and GA is relative to the popula-
tion studied and depends on the measures used to assess these
constructs).
The research presented here was concerned with processes that
ensue after conflict detection and after decisions to attempt over-
riding autonomously-triggered responses with responses based
on analytic processing. In the dual-process theory advocated by
Evans and Stanovich (e.g., Evans, 2007, 2008, 2012; Stanovich,
2009a,b, 2012; Reyna and Brainerd, 2011; Evans and Stanovich,
2013), rapid processing of problem content activates potential
responses. These autonomous responses are not necessarily inad-
equate or non-normative (Handley et al., 2011; Thompson and
Johnson, 2014); instead, they are accompanied by varying “feel-
ings of rightness” (Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2013).
Notably, the findings of Handley, Thompson, and colleagues,
indicating that normative responses are sometimes automatically
activated, provide additional weight to cautionary notes to guard
against assuming that analytic processing necessarily underlies
normative responses (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001; Reyna et al., 2003;
Elqayam and Evans, 2011; Evans, 2011; Reyna and Brainerd, 2011;
Stanovich et al., 2011). In the present work, normative responses
may sometimes have been activated automatically, a possibility
that might partially explain why thinking dispositions, general
ability, and numeracy accounted for only 36% of the response
variance. As implied below, measures of “feeling of rightness” and
inhibition would likely have explained additional variance.
The stronger the “feelings of rightness” elicited by automatic
responses, the lower the probability that reasoners will attempt
to replace these responses with consciously deliberated answers
(Thompson and Morsanyi, 2012; Thompson et al., 2013). The
model tested here is therefore likely more relevant to autonomous
responses associated with weak “rightness feelings” (or sensing
“something fishy” about intuitive responses; De Neys, 2012,
p. 31). At a minimum level, the decision to judge the sufficiency
of the intuitive responses that trigger weak “feelings of rightness”
is a metacognitive, reflective process. However, to further engage
analytic processes and fully evaluate automatic responses, both
reflective operations and algorithmic resources are required
(the latter to compare intuitive responses against responses
based on careful deliberation and to internalized standards; see
also Moshman, 1998). If an automatically-activated response
is deemed inadequate (e.g., inaccurate and/or insufficiently
precise), reflective abilities again come into play to assess task
requirements, select the appropriate algorithmic skills, and
judge the outcomes of implementing those skills. Algorithmic
resources are, of course, not only necessary to carry out these
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procedures and implement specific reasoning, decision making,
and computational skills, but also to suppress initial responses
and inhibit interference from potentially misleading beliefs
activated by task content (e.g., stereotypes) or by the intuitive
responses themselves.
To summarize, metacognitive operations at the reflective level
determine whether override should be attempted (Klaczynski,
2004; Thompson, 2009; Evans, 2010). Following this decision,
the generation of decoupled representations depends on reflec-
tive functioning (e.g., recognition of task requirements/structure)
which, in turn, is dependent on general algorithmic resources
and specific experiences and skills. After such representations
are generated, the appropriate mindware (e.g., numeracy)—if
available—must be selected (Stanovich, 2012). Even if available,
correct strategy/skill selection does not guarantee that implemen-
tation will be effective. Inability to sustain generated represen-
tations and inhibit autonomous responses (effortful processes
requiring both algorithmic resources and reflective dispositions;
see Stanovich and West, 2008) can lead to interference from non-
essential task contents and implementation errors (see also the
discussion of “levels of rationality” in Reyna et al., 2003). Clearly,
as anticipated by the arguments and supported by the evidence
proffered by Reyna et al. (2003) and others (e.g., Evans, 2011;
Stanovich et al., 2011; Klaczynski, 2013), attempts to override
responses based on autonomous processing are neither invariably
successful nor invariably lead to normative responses.
By themselves, neither algorithmic capabilities (including
specific mindware) nor competence at the reflective level suf-
ficed to produce normative responses. In Stanovich’s theory, the
reflective-algorithmic relationship is reciprocal because reflec-
tive operations are necessarily constrained by available resources
(Stanovich and West, 2008). Thus, even those at the highest gen-
eral ability and numeracy levels typically gave non-normative
responses when their reflective dispositions and skills were poor
(see also Overton, 1990; Amsel et al., 2008; Chiesi et al., 2011;
Ricco and Overton, 2011; Morsanyi and Handley, 2013). Several
reflective-level difficulties, such as failures to accurately assess
task requirements, attend to numerical information in accurate
representations, select appropriate computational skills, monitor
numeric functions and outputs, or equate subjectively-adequate
responses with normative responses, could have led to non-
normative responses. Conversely, even participants at the highest
levels of reflectivity and numeracy typically gave non-normative
responses if their general ability scores were low. Lacking the
requisite resources to implement and monitor their numeric
skills while maintaining decoupled representations (see Stanovich
et al., 2011, 2012; Stanovich, 2012), these individuals performed
no better than those at low levels of reflective functioning and
numeracy.
The findings support the theory of analytic processing pro-
posed by Stanovich (2009a, 2011) and implicate numeracy as
a specific algorithmic skill likely to further our understanding
of the processes underlying performance on HB tasks. Research
on the role of instructions in reasoning is also consistent, and
can be interpreted from the perspective of, Stanovich’s theory.
Evidence from several reports indicates that reliance on heuris-
tics decreases and normative responses increase when participants
are instructed to think logically (e.g., Denes-Raj and Epstein,
1994). Recent findings (e.g., Macpherson and Stanovich, 2007;
Evans et al., 2010; Handley et al., 2011; Morsanyi and Handley,
2012; Morsanyi et al., 2012) have further demonstrated that such
instructions improve responding primarily among high ability
participants and that, in the absence of such instructions, gen-
eral ability is unrelated to responding on some tasks. If conceived
as externally-imposed surrogates for well-calibrated thinking
dispositions—or as cues to engage in reflective-level operations—
logic instructions should only benefit those with sufficient algo-
rithmic capacity to not only keep the instructions inmind but also
construct accurate representations and conduct the relevant com-
putations. Just as it constrains reflective-level functioning, general
ability limits the efficacy of logic instructions.
Despite evidence consistent with the view that a function
of the reflective level is to select, guide, and monitor algorith-
mic operations and that algorithmic limitations constrain not
only these reflective operations but also the implementation of
specific abilities, there are reasons to guard against interpret-
ing the current findings as definitive support for this theoretic
position. Specifically, the correlational nature of the study pro-
hibits the conclusions that thinking dispositions constrained the
functioning of general ability and that limitations in general abil-
ity constrained numeric operations (see Footnotes 1 and 6). For
instance, the hypothesized relationship between thinking dispo-
sitions and general ability is reciprocal; however, it was not pos-
sible to examine directly bidirectional (or unidirectional) causal
relationships in the present work. Even if the causal relation-
ships operate as hypothesized on probabilistic tasks, the model
does not explain findings that, on some HB tasks, (a) thinking
dispositions sometimes predict performance but general ability
does not, (b) general ability sometimes predicts performance but
thinking dispositions do not, and (c) neither thinking disposi-
tions nor general ability relate positively to performance (e.g.,
Klaczynski, 2000; Stanovich and West, 2008; Thompson and
Johnson, 2014). These mixed and sometimes null findings may,
to some extent, be attributable to the fact that measures of general
ability and thinking dispositions are imperfect indexes of algo-
rithmic and reflective functioning. Replications of, for instance,
research on myside biases that utilizes more specific (and/or
more extensive) measures of algorithmic (e.g., inhibition) and
reflective (e.g., metacognitive monitoring) processes would likely
contribute valuable insights toward explaining these findings.
Another issue is that the individual differences measures
accounted for only 36% of response variance. One reason for this,
alluded to earlier, is that normative responses are sometimes acti-
vated automatically. In such instances, complete engagement of
analytic resources is not always necessary (reasoners may even
forgo checks of response override when automatic normative
responses are accompanied by strong feelings of rightness). An
expansion of this account may also help explain the unexplained
variance: When initial responses prompt attempts to override
and to construct decoupled representations, it is conceivable that
the process of assessing task requirements automatically activates
normative responses. That is, the effort that goes into over-
ride and/or decoupling may be sufficient to trigger normative
responses. In such cases, algorithmic resources would be taxed
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little (see Thompson and Johnson, 2014) and reflective operations
would be relatively limited (e.g., monitoring computation quality
would neither be necessary nor possible). This account, however,
awaits empirical testing.
Nonetheless, at least on probabilistic reasoning tasks, the com-
bination of well-calibrated beliefs and intellectual dispositions
with moderate-high cognitive ability may well lead to normative
responses if specific micro-strategies or mindware (e.g., numer-
acy) are available. The findings thus lend additional substance
to recent discussions of dual-process theories, support the dis-
tinction between the reflective and algorithmic levels of analytic
processing, and contribute new data to the growing literature on
numeracy. Even so, additional research examining the interac-
tions among thinking dispositions, general ability, and specific
abilities is clearly needed. In conducting these investigations,
theory-driven moderation (and mediation) analyses will likely
yield results more informative than those based on less precise
analyses (e.g., ANOVA). When coupled with findings from exper-
imental research, our understanding of the processes that underlie
judgments, reasoning, and decisions will likely improve consider-
ably. Arguments over whether responses judged normative should
be considered prescriptive can be better addressed empirically.
As an example, if general abilities are subordinated to thinking
dispositions/epistemic regulation and the latter can be acquired
through formal and informal tuition—and if some specific algo-
rithmic abilities are educable—then the possibility the reducing
the gap between traditional norms (“what ought”) and actual
behavior (“what is”) remains open (for discussion and alternative
perspectives, see Elqayam and Evans, 2011).
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